LEGISLATIVE REFORM OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF AGENCY ACTIONS
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.t

Sidney Shapiro and Richard Levy have provided an excellent
vehicle for discussing the present state of the relationship between
agencies and reviewing courts and of potential methods of improving that relationship.1 Their study of the history of judicial review
of agency action supports their conclusion that many of the legal
doctrines applicable to that process are indeterminate to an unusual degree 2 -a court often can write an opinion that reverses a
major agency action as easily as it can write an opinion that upholds the same action. We do not see, and would not long tolerate, this degree of indeterminacy with respect to the basic doctrines that govern other fields of law. Imagine, for instance, a
world in which the concepts of "offer" and "acceptance" are so
malleable that parties who attempt to enter into a contract can do
no better than to predict that there is a 50% probability that a
court eventually will hold that their conduct created an enforceable contractual relationship. If such a legal environment seems
both unimaginable and intolerable, you are in a position to empathize with a federal agency that must attempt to issue a major
rule that is subject to judicial review through application of the
judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).3 If the agency does everything it believes that it must do
to issue such a rule, the probability that the rule will be upheld is
less than 50%.4 Moreover, the variable that best explains the pattern of judicial decisions that uphold or reverse major rules is the

t Paul J. Kellner Professor of Law, Columbia University.
1. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy
in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE LJ. 1049 (1995).
2. Id. at Part IL
3. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
4. Peter H. Schuck & E. Donald Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical
Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1022 (combining data from
1965, 1975, and 1984-85 to reveal that reviewing courts upheld only 43.9% of agency
rules).
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ideological composition of the panel of the court that reviews a
rule.5
Shapiro and Levy demonstrate that the tendency toward doctrinal indeterminacy in administrative law is so powerful that it
seems to be impervious even to unanimous Supreme Court decisions that purport to announce relatively determinate doctrines.6
The Court issued unanimous opinions in 1983 and 1984 that practitioners and scholars considered landmarks.7 It is at least arguable that both opinions had the potential to create determinate
doctrines applicable to the most frequently litigated issues in administrative law.' A little over a decade later, Shapiro and Levy
are unable to detect any effects attributable to those two decisions.9 Through a combination of selective citation, recharacterization of doctrine, and manipulation of categories of disputes, both
the Supreme Court and the circuit courts seem to have retained
the same high degree of discretion that existed before the Court
purported to change the applicable doctrines."
Shapiro and Levy conclude that the judiciary is institutionally
incapable of creating determinate doctrines applicable to judicial
review of agency actions." They argue that another institution-Congress-should perform that task. 2 Shapiro and Levy
propose an amendment to the APA that is designed to replace indeterminate judge-made doctrines with determinate legislative instructions to reviewing courts. 3 For purposes of my comments, I
find it useful to divide the Shapiro/Levy work into two projects: a
scholarly article that attempts to identify a problem and its gene-

5. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on
the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988
DUKE LJ. 300, 303-07 [hereinafter Two Problems in Administrative Law]; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police
the Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. LJ. 2031, 2044 (1989).
6. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at Part II.
7. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983).
8. Shapiro and Levy take the position that both opinions had that potential. Shapiro
& Levy, supra note 1, at 1064, 1067. As discussed infra text accompanying notes 47-97, I
agree with their assessment of Chevron, but disagree with their assessment of State Farm.
9. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1064-65, 1067-68.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1071.
12. Id. at 1070.
13. Id. at 1071-1074.
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sis, and a specific statutory amendment that attempts to address
the problem identified in the article.
I. THE ARTICLE

Shapiro and Levy reach two major conclusions: (1) the doctrines applicable to judicial review of agency action are indeterminate and manipulable; 4 and (2) the judiciary is incapable of creating and maintaining determinate doctrines in this area of law.15
With a few important qualifications, I accept the accuracy of the
first conclusion. 6 I hope and believe that the Supreme Court will
prove the second conclusion wrong.' 7 I must admit, however, that
the Court's pattern of decisions in recent years provides support
for -their pessimistic prognosis."8 Since the qualifications I would
add to their first conclusion follow logically from my application
of the model they use to support their second conclusion, I will
begin by summarizing that model.
Shapiro and Levy model judicial behavior as a function of
two variables: craft norms and outcomes. 9 All other things being
equal, any judge prefers to conform with craft norms, i.e., to write
an opinion that shows respect for precedents, decisions of higher
courts, instructions from legislative bodies, policy decisions of politically accountable agencies, and the Constitution. If judges were
motivated solely by this factor, caselaw would be characterized by
a high degree of determinacy, consistency, and predictability. Judges also prefer outcomes that coincide with their ideological beliefs,
however. All other things being equal, any judge prefers an outcome consistent with her ideological beliefs. It follows that a judge
will respond to this motivation if she can write an opinion that
yields the "correct" outcome while it simultaneously conforms with
craft norms. The model predicts that a field of law that is characterized by clear, determinate doctrines will produce a coherent,
predictable pattern of outcomes. By contrast, a field that is characterized by indeterminate doctrines will produce an incoherent, un14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id. at 1064-1066, 1067-68.
Id. at 1071.
See infra text accompanying notes 25-46.
See infra text accompanying notes 60-97.
See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invita.

tion to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 CoLUM. L. REV.

(forthcoming April 1995) (manuscript at 22-44, on file with author).
19. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1051.
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predictable pattern of outcomes in which the outcome of a specific
case depends primarily on the ideological beliefs of the judge who
decides the case. 2
Shapiro and Levy use the same model to predict the nature
of the doctrines that are likely to evolve in a field of law.2' To
the extent that the applicable provisions of statutes and the Constitution are themselves indeterminate, legal doctrine is the product of judicial decisionmaking. If craft norms such as "apply the
statute" leave judges with significant discretion to create doctrines
applicable to a class of disputes, judges can choose either relatively indeterminate doctrines or relatively determinate doctrines. The
judicial review provisions of the APA provide judges ample discretion to choose among many potential doctrines applicable to judicial review of agency actionsO In this situation, the model predicts that judges will select relatively determinate doctrines in
fields in which judicial decisions rarely implicate strongly held
ideological beliefs, e.g., commercial law, and relatively indeterminate doctrines in fields in which judicial decisions frequently implicate strongly held ideological beliefs, e.g., administrative law.
The Shapiro/Levy model is powerful. I have no criticism of
the model. I also agree with many of the inferences that Shapiro
and Levy draw through their application of the model to administrative law, and with many of their assertions with respect to the
evidence that corroborates those inferences. In many administrative law contexts, the pattern of judicial decisions is incoherent,
and the best predictor of the outcome of a review proceeding is
the ideological composition of the court that decides the case.'
I differ with Shapiro and Levy with respect to some important
details, however. I am somewhat more optimistic that the judiciary
can, and will, create relatively determinate doctrines applicable to
judicial review of agency actions.24 I see major differences among
the judicial review doctrines that courts presently apply. To identify those differences, I will discuss separately the four doctrines
that dominate judicial review of agency actions: (1) the substantial

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

See id. 1057.
Id. at 1056-60.
See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
See Two Problems in Administrative Law, supra note 5, at 303-07.
See infra text accompanying notes 56-97.
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evidence test; (2) the failure to use proper procedures; (3) the
arbitrary and capricious test; and (4) the violation of a statute.
A. Substantial Evidence
A court is required to uphold an agency action if the agency's
findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence,' defined
as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion."26 I would not characterize the
substantial evidence test as indeterminate. To the contrary, the test
is well understood, and the results of its application are easy to
predict in the vast majority of cases.27 It has also proven to be
unusually durable and relatively impervious to manipulation; the
substantial evidence test has existed in its present form for at least
forty years.2 9 A 1958 study identified the seven major variables
that explained the likely results of application of the test during
the 1950s.30 Six of the seven variables are equally valuable predictors of the results of judicial applications of the test in the
1990s.' With the exception of two brief periods in two specific
contexts, courts deserve high marks for constructing and applying
this test in a clear and consistent manner.
Both the relative determinacy of the substantial evidence test
and the rare judicial distortions of the test are consistent with the
Shapiro/Levy model. The substantial evidence test applies primarily to findings of fact made in agency adjudications. Most agency
adjudications do not raise issues that divide judges with differing
ideological perspectives. Rulemakings are far more likely to raise
25. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988).
26. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); see also Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1950).
27. See 2 KENNETH CUL? DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE, § 11.2 (3d ed. 1994); RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

& PROCESS § 7.3.1 (2d ed. 1992). The APA authorizes courts to apply the substantial
evidence test only to formal adjudications and formal rulemakings. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988).
Some agency-specific statutes, however, require its application to all agency orders, including informal rulemakings. See, eg., 15 U.S.C. § 717r (1988). Both the meaning of the test
and its effects are less determinate in the context of an informal rulemaking. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra, § 11.4.
28. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of the substantial evidence test, see
2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 11.2.
29. See id.
30. Frank E. Cooper, Administrative Law: The "Substantial Evidence" Rule, 44
A.B.A. J. 945, 1002-03 (1958).
31. See PIERCE Er AL., supra note 27, § 7.3.1.
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ideologically charged issues. Moreover, when an adjudication raises
such an issue, a judge who disagrees strongly with the agency's
resolution of the issue is unlikely to register her opposition to the
agency's policy in the form of a reversal of one of the agency's
findings of fact. A reversal on that basis would not be a particularly effective way to send the agency a broad message of disapproval of its policy. A reversal of an adjudicatory decision based
on an alleged misinterpretation of a statute or an alleged violation
of the arbitrary and capricious test is far more likely to further
that purpose.
Courts manipulated the substantial evidence test to produce
an unusually high rate of reversals of agency adjudicatory decisions in two periods and contexts-NLRB decisions during the
1950s and the early 1960s, and Social Security Administration
disability decisions during the 1980s. Those episodes both validate
the model and illustrate the determinacy of the substantial evidence test. They validate the model because they took place in
unusually politically charged contexts. Labor relations was a controversial field in the 1950s;32 strikes and violent confrontations
were common. Many conservatives equated labor unions with socialism. Moreover, many conservatives believed that the NLRB
had been "captured" by labor unions. It follows that conservative
judges would attempt to find a way to avoid upholding the decisions of an agency that they perceived to be systematically siding
with labor unions. Similarly, social security disability decisionmaking was controversial in the 1980s. Many judges were incensed
at what they perceived to be the heartless policies of the Reagan
Administration toward disabled people.33 Those judges devised a
means of sending the Social Security Administration a broad message of disapproval by reversing an unprecedented proportion of
the agency's decisions to deny benefits.34 In both cases, reviewing
courts had limited ways of expressing their displeasure with the
agencies' policies because both agencies relied primarily on case-

32.

See discussion in 2 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 9.9.

33. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in
Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 481,
501-15 (1990) (discussing political control of adjudicative reform in the Social Security

Administration).
34. Id. at 518.
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by-case adjudication of individual factual disputes to implement
their policies.
Those two episodes 'also illustrate the determinacy of the
substantial evidence test. In both cases, the judges who wanted to
reverse a high proportion of the agency decisions discovered that
they could not do so without explicitly modifying the substantial
evidence test. The test was insufficiently malleable to permit its
systematic manipulation by result-oriented judges. The judges who
were displeased with the NLRB's pattern of decisions in the 1950s
reversed a high proportion of those decisions by adopting a special
exception to the substantial evidence test. Under the exception,
the NLRB could not make a finding of fact inconsistent with the
testimony of a supervisor unless that testimony was impeached or
seriously undermined on cross-examination. 5 The judges who
were displeased with the Social Security Administration's pattern
of decisions in the 1980s adopted another special exception to the
test. This exception specified that the agency could not make a
finding of fact inconsistent with the opinions expressed by the
applicant's treating physician except in unusual circumstances. 6
Judges who attempt to indulge their preference for particular
outcomes by adopting special exceptions to generally applicable
doctrines expose themselves both to a high risk of reversal and to
a high risk of criticisms that are predicated on their violation of
craft norms. The Supreme Court reversed the courts that adopted
the special rule applicable to NLRB decisions and criticized the
judges for departing from craft norms.37 The courts that established the special rule applicable to disability decisionmaking in
the 1980s retreated from that special rule in the 1990s3 in response to persistent criticisms of their departure from craft
norms3 9 and a clever tactical counterattack by the agency 4
With the exception of these rare episodes, the substantial evidence

35. See, eg., NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 286 F.2d 16, 25 (5th Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369
U.S. 404 (1962); NLRB v. Florida Citrus Canners Coop., 288 F.2d 630, 636-38 (5th Cir.
1961), rev'd sub nom., NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404 (1962).

36. See, e.g., Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29, 31 (2d Cir. 1986); Bluvband v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 886, 892 (2d Cir. 1984).

37. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 407-09 (1962).
38. See, eg., Schisler v. Sullivan, 3 F.3d 563, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1993).
39.

See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND AP-

PEALS, 49-53, 57 (1978).

40. The counterattack consisted of issuance of a legislative rule, which the circuit
court felt compelled to uphold in Schisler, 3 F.3d at 569.
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test has proven to be remarkably durable and determinate with respect to its traditional application to findings of fact made in agency adjudications.
B. ProceduralInadequacy
Since 1978, the courts also have implemented a simple, determinate doctrine applicable to judicial review of the adequacy of
the decisionmaking procedures that agencies must use. During the
1960s and the early 1970s, judges often used their skepticism with
respect to the wisdom of the outcome of an agency proceeding as
the unstated basis for holding that the agency's decisionmaking
procedures were inadequate in some respect.4 ' This approach
produced massive indeterminacy since the courts never stated
coherent criteria for deciding what procedures an agency was
required to use in various circumstances. The Court brought that
practice to an abrupt halt in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.42 The Court
held unanimously that a reviewing court cannot reverse an agency
action on the basis of an alleged procedural deficiency unless the
agency has violated an explicit statutory command or the Constitution.43 The Court has never retreated from, or manipulated, that
doctrine, and lower courts adhere to it consistently. The doctrine
is determinate and has real bite. Judicial reversals of agency actions predicated on alleged procedural inadequacies declined significantly and permanently after 1978."
This aspect of the law applicable to judicial review of agency
actions is difficult to explain in a manner consistent with the
Shapiro/Levy model. The holding in Vermont Yankee has had a
particularly large effect on the class of agency actions that most
frequently raise ideologically charged issues-legislative rulemakings.45 Moreover, the effect of the holding has been clear:
judges lost a significant proportion of their preexisting discretion

41.

See, eg., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 483 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir.

1973). See generally 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 7.8.
42. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
43. Id. at 543-48.
44. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch. Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE LJ. 387, 407 n.86.
45. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 7.8.
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to apply an indeterminate doctrine as a means of indulging their
preference for outcomes that are consistent with their ideological
perspectives.
The Shapiro/Levy model might be able to explain this aspect
of doctrine by reference to the Justices' dedication to craft norms.
The craft norm enforced by Vermont Yankee might be stated as
follows: it is institutionally inappropriate for judges to apply indeterminate doctrines as a pretext for rejecting an outcome of an
agency proceeding that is inconsistent with the judge's ideological
beliefs. I consider that principle to be an important craft norm. If
it is accepted as such, however, it is difficult for the Shapiro/Levy
model to explain the existence of any indeterminate doctrine applicable to judicial review of agency actions. I will return to this
problem in my discussion of the doctrine applicable to judicial
review of agency interpretations of statutes.46
C. Arbitrary and Capricious
I accept completely Shapiro and Levy's characterization of the
present version of the arbitrary and capricious test as indeterminate.47 I am more optimistic about the prospects that the Court
will reduce that indeterminacy, however. I also differ with Shapiro
and Levy's description of the history of the test.
As Shapiro and Levy note, the version of the arbitrary and
capricious test that is applied in administrative law today is the
product of a single case. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,48 the Court described the test in the following manner:
Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the
agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it
to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter
to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it
could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.49

46. See infra text accompanying notes 78-97.
47. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1064.
48.

463 U.S. 29 (1983).

49. Id. at 43.
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The Court applied that test and held that the agency rule at issue
in State Farm was arbitrary and capricious." The Court concluded
unanimously that the agency erred by wholly failing to discuss an
obvious alternative to the action taken in the rule.5 By a five-tofour margin, the Court also concluded that the agency erred by
predicating its rule on an assumed pattern of automobile-driver
behavior that was inconsistent with the only studies of driver behavior that were available then to the agency. 2
In the twelve years since it decided State Farm, the Court has
rarely cited the case and has never since reversed an agency action
on the basis of the test announced in State Farm." Circuit courts
cite and apply the State Farm test in slightly less than one-half of
the cases to which it applies. 4 Generally, a reviewing court ignores State Farm when it upholds an agency action and applies the
State Farm test when it reverses an agency action. This is the test
that best fits the Shapiro/Levy characterization of a doctrine as
being so indeterminate that judges routinely manipulate it to support outcomes that are consistent with a judge's ideological perspective.
I disagree with Shapiro and Levy's description of the evolution of the arbitrary and capricious test, however. They characterize State Farm as "a more determinate approach to substantive review" and as "a more exact definition of the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard." 5 I would characterize State Farm as having had
the opposite effect: it increased doctrinal indeterminacy.
The arbitrary and capricious test has a long and rich history in
the U.S. legal system. In particular, it has been used as the basis
for deciding whether a statute violates the Equal Protection Clause
or the Due Process Clause. In that context, arbitrary and capricious is used as a synonym for irrational; if a legislative body
could rationally believe that the statute might further a legitimate
purpose that is within the power of the legislature to further, then

50. Id. at 46.
51. Id at 51.
52. Id. at 54.
53. I replicated the search described in Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1065 n.62.
and accompanying text, confirmed their results, and found no cases in which the Court
had cited State Farm as the basis for reversing an agency action.
54. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1065.
55. Id. at 1064.
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the statute must be upheld. 6 The Supreme Court originally applied this traditional version of the arbitrary and capricious test to
agency actions.5 7 As so defined and applied, the arbitrary and capricious test is weak but determinate.
During the late 1960s and the 1970s, circuit courts gradually
strengthened the arbitrary and capricious test as it was applied to
agency actions. 8 By 1983, the test had become extraordinarily
open-ended. A court could reverse an agency rule with which the
court disagreed if the court could identify any significant gap, or
arguable flaw, in the agency's reasoning process or in the factual
or scientific predicates for the agency's action. 9 Since such flaws
and gaps are inevitable in the process of issuing a major rule, the
effect of this change in doctrine was to confer on judges near total
de facto discretion to reverse any rule that was inconsistent with
their ideological beliefs. Practitioners, scholars, and circuit court
judges interpreted the Court's opinion in State Farm as legitimating the new version of the arbitrary and capricious test that had
evolved in circuit courts during the late 1960s and the 1970s.'
Thus, State Farm transformed a weak, determinate doctrine into a
doctrine so indeterminate that any judge could manipulate it to
obtain her preferred outcome without violating craft norms.
I do not share Shapiro and Levy's pessimism with respect to
the future of this doctrine, however. I expect that the Court will
significantly reduce the degree of indeterminacy inherent in the
arbitrary and capricious test. The Court may even return to the
traditional weak but determinate doctrine that defines arbitrary
and capricious as irrational. While the Court has not applied the
State Farm test as the basis for reversing an agency action since it
decided State Farm, it has reversed two circuit court decisions that
applied the State Farm test as the basis for reversing agency actions." The Court used those 1990 and 1991 cases as vehicles to
56. See, eg., Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959).
57. Se e.g., Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. white, 296 U.S. 176, 178-80 (1935).
58. See, eg., Mobil Oil Co. v. Department of Energy, 610 F.2d 796, 801-02 (Temp.
Emer. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937 (1980); National Tire Dealers &
Retreaders Ass'n v. Brinegar, 491 F.2d 31, 41 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
59. See generally 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 7.4.
60. I agree with Shapiro and Levy that the Court's opinion in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), had introduced confusion and indeterminacy with respect to the meaning and effect of the arbitrary and capricious test during
the years prior to State Farm. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1064.
61. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing S.E. Inc. v. United Distribution Cos., 498
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express doubt about the wisdom of the State Farm test and to reduce its scope. 62 Eight Justices joined the majority opinions in
those cases. The addition of Justice Breyer to the Court probably
has sealed the fate of the extraordinarily indeterminate State Farm
test.' Justice Breyer has repeatedly criticized the test as illegitimate, as beyond the competence of courts, and as imposing unrealistic demands on agencies. 64
D. Statutory Interpretation
I also agree with Shapiro and Levy's characterization of the
doctrine applicable to judicial review of agency statutory interpretations as being indeterminate, at least to the extent that doctrine
is now being applied by the Supreme Court.' Here again, however, I disagree with their description of the doctrine's evolution. I
am also more optimistic than Shapiro and Levy with respect to the
likelihood that the Court will increase the determinacy of this
doctrine.
I agree with Shapiro and Levy that the doctrine applicable to
judicial review of agency interpretations of agency-administered
statutes was indeterminate until 1984.6 The Court used two dramatically different tests to determine whether an agency's interpretation of a statute was permissible; it simply applied one test when
it wanted to uphold an agency action and the other when it wanted to reverse an action. This pattern of behavior supports the
inference that the Justices were using doctrinal indeterminacy to
mask result-oriented decisionmaking. In its opinion in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,67 however,
the Court purported to replace the prior "choose your test" doctrinal regime with a single, simple test:
U.S. 211, 214-15 (1991); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 647,
656 (1990).
62. Mobil Oil, 498 U.S. at 229-31; LTV, 496 U.S. at 645-46. See Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 59, 78-82 (1995).
63. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Justice Breyer: Intentionalist, Pragmatist, and Empiricist,
8 ADMIN. LJ. (forthcoming April 1995) (manuscript at 5-8, on file with author).
64.

Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.

REV. 363, 382-97 (1986). See also Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Court's Role
in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1833, 1833 (1978).

65. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1065.
66. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1049; 1 DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 27,
§ 3.1.
67.

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would
be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's
answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.6
As Shapiro and Levy note, the Chevron test was widely expected to yield greater determinacy in this important area of
law.69 I also agree with their claim that the Chevron test is not
presently having this expected beneficial effect.7" I disagree, however, with their description of the reasons why the test has failed
to fulfill our initial expectations for it.
Shapiro and Levy say that "the rate of affirmance of agencies
in the Supreme Court and the circuit courts is about the same
now as (or even lower than) before Chevron was decided."71 This
statement suggests that the Chevron test was inherently indeterminate. I have a different interpretation of the data. One year after
Chevron, the rate of affirmance of agency actions by circuit courts
increased from 70.9% to 81.3%.72 Moreover, there was a 39.1%
decline in the proportion of cases in which reversal was based on
a judicially detected error in an agency's interpretation of a statute
that the agency was required to implement.73 These data suggest
that the Chevron test significantly increased the degree of doctrinal
determinacy in the circuit courts. In the last few years, however,
this effect of the test has begun to dissipate.
The Supreme Court must take full responsibility for the present failure of the Chevron test to serve its original purpose. The
Court began to change its method of applying the test in the
1988-89 Term.74 By the 1993-94 Term, the Court had eviscerated
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 842-43 (citations omitted).
See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1049.
Id. at 1067-68.
Id. at 1068-69 (citations omitted).
Schuck & Elliott, supra note 4, at 1030.

73.

Id. at 1033.

74. See Pierce, supra note 18 at 47-48; Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Fu-

1995]

LEGISLATIVE REFORM

1123

Chevron by adopting new hypertextualist methods of statutory
interpretation that rarely allow a court to conclude that any statute
is ambiguous-the predicate for moving to the second step of
Chevron.75 A plurality of four Justices now appears to place such
a high value on allowing judges to indulge their preference for
outcomes that conform with their ideological perspectives that they
are willing to sacrifice the increased doctrinal determinacy and
political accountability the Court originally promised in Chevron to
achieve that result.76 Now that most circuit courts have a majority
of ideologically conservative judges, the conservative Justices appear to prefer that the courts, rather than the politically accountable branches of government, play the dominant role in the
policymaking process.77 The Justices can further that goal by authorizing judges to attribute fictitious intents to Congress by engaging in creative analyses of statutory language and by ignoring
all other evidence that would support either a different interpretation or a conclusion that the statute is ambiguous.78 For five reasons, however, I expect the Court to retreat from its recent tendency to infuse ever-increasing indeterminacy in the doctrine applicable to judicial review of agency interpretations of agency-administered statutes.
First, only four Justices seem to be committed to the new
interpretive approach at the present time. 9 Assuming that each
of those Justices retains his present level of commitment, the plurality can implement its agenda only by persuading one or two
colleagues to join the plurality in each case. The plurality was successful in accomplishing this task in five of six cases decided during the 1993-94 Term. 0 The addition of Justice Breyer to the
Court is likely to make this task more difficult, however. Justice
Breyer's approach to statutory interpretation is near the other end

ture of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 357-60 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill,

Judicial Deference to Agency Precedent, 101 YALE L.i. 969, 983 (1992).
75. See Pierce, supra note 18, at 6.
76. The plurality consists of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas. See id. at 6 n.19.
77. See Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Solving the Chevron Puzzle, 57 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. Spring 1994, at 65, 68.
78. See Pierce, supra note 18, at 23.
79. Id. at 8-22.
80. Id.
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of the spectrum
from that of the members of the hypertextualist
8t
plurality.
Second, the hypertextualist approach is inconsistent with an
important craft norm. Its indeterminacy empowers judges to engage in sub rosa substitution of their views of wise policy for the
views of politically accountable institutions.' The Court has repeatedly and unanimously embraced a craft norm that disapproves
of such a judicial arrogation of policymaking power;' this craft
norm was the principal basis for the Court's opinions in Chevron
and Vermont Yankee.' The mounting chorus of criticism of the
Court for this deviation from an important craft norm will make it
increasingly difficult for the hypertextualist plurality to persuade
colleagues to join them.' It also may change the minds of one or
more members of that plurality; two of the members of the
hypertextualist plurality have indicated their enthusiastic support
for this craft norm in the past.'
Third, the new approach to statutory interpretation will produce cacophony and incoherence in the administrative stateY The
federal judiciary is characterized by high ideological heterogeneity.
If each of the more than 800 federal judges believes that she is required to divine the one "plain meaning" of each provision of
81. See Stephen Breyer, The 1991 Justice Lester W. Roth Lecture, On the Uses of
Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.C. L. REv. 845, 847 (1992) (arguing that
courts should not abandon the practice of attempting to ascertain legislative intent when
interpreting statutes).
82. See Pierce, supra note 18, at 49.
83. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984); Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87 (1983); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
84. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66; Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524-25, 558.
85. See supra notes 75 and 78 and accompanying text; see also Peter Strauss, On
Resegregating the Worlds of Statutes and Common Law, 1995 Sup. Cr. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 57-59, on file with author); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 623 (1990) (expounding on what the author calls "the
new textualism"--the Court's doctrine giving itself the authority to determine the plain
meaning of a statute and to find that legislative history is irrelevant).
86. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court in Vermont Yankee, 435
U.S. at 523. Prior to 1988, Justice Scalia wrote several opinions and a law review article
in which he extolled the virtues of the Chevron doctrine. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food
& Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 133-34 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453-54 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); see
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
LJ. 511, 512-21.
87. See Pierce, supra note 18, at 6-7.
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each agency-administered statute, all agencies will soon be subject
to a plethora of inconsistent judicial decisions. As this effect of the
hypertextualist approach becomes more apparent, it will attract
even more critical attention to the Court's departure from craft
norms.
Fourth, the hypertextualist approach will exacerbate the serious workload problems within the judicial branch.' It will significantly increase the number of intercircuit conflicts that the Supreme Court must resolve. It will also significantly increase the
workloads of the circuit courts; it takes a lot of time and effort to
draft the kind of intricate and imaginative opinions that are required to support a conclusion that an ambiguous statute has a
single plain meaning. Most circuit court judges must decide an
average of over one case per day.89 They cannot afford to devote
scores of hours to the task of writing elaborate opinions in every
case that raises a question with respect to the meaning of an agency-administered statute.
Two anecdotes are useful to illustrate the prosaic forces that
limit the ability of the members of the judiciary to use indeterminate doctrines to empower themselves to engage in doctrinal manipulation to achieve the outcomes they prefer. The first comes
from a recent clerk for a circuit court judge.' He reported numerous conversations in which a judge stated that he had not yet
been able to determine the meaning of a statutory provision or in
which the members of a panel experienced difficulty reaching
agreement with respect to a provision's meaning. After spending a
modest amount of time attempting to interpret the provision or
attempting to reach agreement concerning its interpretation, the
problem was resolved by using Chevron as a verb, e.g., "Let's
Chevron it and move on to a more tractable case." I do not criticize that practice; I applaud it. If a judge cannot determine the
meaning of a statute based on a few hours of study, or if a panel
cannot reach agreement with respect to its meaning quickly in a

88. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year Some Implications of
the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 1093, 1096-100 (1987); 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 3.4.
89. The average circuit court judge must decide 372 cases per year. FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 110
(1990).
90. 1994 conversation with a former clerk whose identity I have agreed not to disclose.
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conference, it is highly unlikely that Congress "unambiguously"
expressed its intent with respect to the issue. 91
The second anecdote comes from a circuit judge. 2 I delivered a paper in which I noted that the D.C. Circuit consistently
reverses agency actions in a higher proportion of cases than does
any other circuit.9' I suggested several possible explanations for
this phenomenon. A judge from another circuit approached me at
the coffee break and suggested that I had overlooked the most
obvious explanation-the differences in circuit caseloads. He said
that in his circuit the workload is so large that he could afford to
write the type of long, detailed opinion that is required to reverse
an agency action in only a tiny fraction of cases. He stated that he
does so in the few cases in which he is confident that the agency
had made a serious error and that he "Chevrons" the rest of the
cases in brief opinions upholding the agency action. He suggested
that the decades-old problem of the D.C. Circuit's unusually intrusive approach to administrative law could be resolved simply by
increasing that circuit's caseload per judge to the point at which it
is equivalent to that of other circuits.
Finally, judges and Justices who believe that they can further
a substantive agenda by creating and applying indeterminate and
highly manipulable administrative law doctrines are being shortsighted. A strategy of that type can never work for long because
the ideological composition of all three branches of government is
constantly changing.94 Justices who adopt such a strategy will
awaken one day to discover that they have empowered their ideological foes and emasculated their ideological friends. Eventually,

91. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-843 (1984).
92. 1992 conversation with a federal judge whose identity I have agreed not to disclose.

93. See Two Problems in Administrative Law, supra note 5, at 304-05; see also Roy
W. McLeese III, Note, Disagreement in D.C.: The Relationship Between the Supreme
Court and the D.C. Circuit and Its Implications for a National Court of Appeals, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1048, 1052-60 (1984) (noting that the D.C. Circuit often decides administrative cases in a way that expands judicial involvement and oversight in agency actions);
Antonin Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme Court,
1978 Sup. Cr. REv. 345, 359 (criticizing the D.C. Circuit's substitution of an "elaborate,
'evolving,' court-made scheme" for the "rudimentary procedural mandates of the APA");
Schuck & Elliott, supra note 4, at 1041-42 (presenting data that indicate that the D.C.
Circuit reverses administrative law cases more frequently than do the other federal courts
of appeals).
94. See Pierce, supra note 18, at 50-51.
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Justices who attempt to further an ideological agenda in this manner are likely to recognize that the only doctrines that will perform well over time are those that are shaped with reference to
the comparative advantages of the institutions of government,
rather than with reference to the transient ideological composition
of those institutions. 95 To paraphrase the Chevron opinion, if
Congress has directly and definitively resolved an issue, the court
must enforce Congress's decision against the President. 96 When
Congress has not acted in that manner, the issue is one of policy
that is more appropriately resolved by the President, or by one of
his agents, than by a politically unaccountable judge. 7
II. THE PROPOSED STATUTORY AMENDMENT
Because of their pessimism with respect to the likelihood that
the courts can, or will, create reasonably determinate doctrines
applicable to judicial review of agency actions, Shapiro and Levy
urge Congress to perform this task by enacting a statutory amendment to the APA.98 Given my somewhat more optimistic prognosis with respect to a potential judicial solution to this serious problem, I am less enthusiastic about their proposed legislative solution. Proposing a legislative solution to a problem is a risky business. If the political environment in the House and Senate is not
"just right" when the proposed amendment is introduced, the
result can significantly increase the problem. I would support a
legislative solution if (1) I was confident that the statutory language would solve the problem and (2) I was confident that the
legislature would be willing to enact such an amendment. I am
skeptical with respect to the possible existence of either of those
conditions.
Congress might be willing to enact an amendment to the APA
of the type proposed by Shapiro and Levy solely because such an
amendment would be likely to improve the performance of the
government. This reason might be enough to carry the day, but I

95. For an excellent analysis of these problems of institutional choice, see NEIL K.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECr ALTERNATIVES:

CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS

IN LAW, ECONOMICS,

AND PUBLIC PoLICY (1994).
96. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984).
97. Id. at 865-66.
98. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1071-72.
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doubt it. Legislators tend to be more motivated by the desire to
obtain their ideologically preferred outcomes than are judges and
Justices. Unlike members of the judiciary, legislators are not constrained by the countervailing desire to adhere to craft norms. I
suspect that the newly empowered Republican majority in Congress would be unenthusiastic about a proposal that would reallocate power from the Republican-dominated judiciary to the Democratic President. Indeed, Congress seems enthusiastic instead about
the prospect of enacting amendments to the APA that would have
the opposite effect. The extensive amendments to the APA included in the Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act of 1995 would
have the effect of dramatically increasing the discretion of judges
to reverse agency actions that are inconsistent with their ideological beliefs." A legislative reform of the type urged by Shapiro
and Levy would have little chance of enactment except in relatively unusual conditions, e.g., when both Congress and the White
House are controlled by one party, and the judiciary is dominated
by members of the other party.
Even if the political preconditions for beneficial legislative
reform exist at some future time, the task of drafting such an
amendment is both important and difficult. Shapiro and Levy
propose a new APA section 706:w
§ 706. Scope of Review
The reviewing court shall ... (2) hold unlawful and set aside
agency actions, findings, and conclusions if the court determines
that
(A) the agency decision violates a constitutional right, power,
privilege, or immunity;
(B) the agency decision was made without observance of procedure required by law;
(C) the agency decision violates its statutory mandate or other
statutory provisions because:
(1) the issue has been specifically resolved by explicit statutory language;
(2) the issue has been specifically resolved by legislative
history manifesting an unmistakable congressional intent; or
(3) a contrary interpretation of the statute is unequivocally
required by the traditional tools of statutory construction;
99. See Titles III and VII of the Job Creation and Wage Enhancement Act, introduced by House Republicans in January 1995. H.R. 9, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
100. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1071-72.
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(D) the agency has not offered a valid policy explanation for its
decision because:
(1) it relied on policy concerns that were precluded by statute; or
(2) entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem; or
(E) the agency has not offered a logically coherent explanation in
terms of agency expertise, credibility determinations, or policy
considerations, of
(1) why the evidence in the record supports its decision; or
(2) why the contrary evidence does not preclude the decision.
Subsection (C) addresses judicial review of agency statutory
interpretations. In that section, Shapiro and Levy rely primarily oh
two drafting techniques. First, they disaggregate the factors that
courts now consider together in the process of reviewing agency
interpretations of statutes. Thus, their amendment has separate
instructions for statutory language, legislative history, and "traditional tools of statutory construction."'' I am not sure whether
this change in language would make the process of judicial review
more or less determinate. What if a court concludes that the statutory language points one way, while the legislative history points
another way, and an applicable canon of construction suggests yet
a third interpretation?
Shapiro and Levy rely on a second drafting technique in an
apparent effort to avoid this problem. They rely on a series of adjectives and adverbs that instruct reviewing courts to uphold the
agency interpretation unless the court is confident that the agency
is wrong. Thus, statutory language can justify a reversal only if it
is "specific" and "explicit"; legislative history can have that effect
only if it is "specific" and "unmistakable"; while "traditional
tools," like canons of construction, can support reversal only if
that result is "unequivocally required."
I understand their reasons for choosing this drafting technique,
but I am not sure whether it will work. There are at least two
questions relevant to the likely efficacy of this approach. First, will
courts take the adjectives and adverbs seriously? Sometimes they
do, and sometimes they don't. A high proportion of the present
indeterminacy of the doctrines applicable to judicial review of
101. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1988).
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agency actions is attributable to the unwillingness of courts to take
seriously the adjectives "concise" and "general" that modify the
APA § 553(c) requirement that an agency incorporate in each rule
a "concise general statement of its basis and purpose."" ° Courts
frequently reverse agency rules because of some alleged inadequacy in a several-hundred page statement of basis and purpose. The
D.C. Circuit has warned practitioners and agencies not to take
seriously the adjectives "concise" and "general."1 3 I am not confident that the courts would take seriously adjectives like "specific"
when they are unwilling to take seriously adjectives like "concise"
and "general."
Second, what should a court do if it concludes that statutory
language "specifically" and "explicitly" resolves an issue one way,
while legislative history "specifically" and "unmistakenly" demonstrates that Congress intended a different resolution of the issue?
This is not a fanciful question. In four of the seven statutory interpretation cases decided during the 1993-94 Term, a majority of the
Court concluded that the "plain language" of a statute compelled
an interpretation that was inconsistent both with the agency's longstanding interpretation and with the "explicit" legislative history
that manifested an "unmistakable" contrary legislative intent.1 ' 4
Shapiro and Levy rely in part on the same combination of
drafting techniques in subsection (D). That section addresses two
of the four parts of the State Farm version of the arbitrary and
capricious test-failure to consider an important aspect of a problem and reliance on policy concerns that are precluded by statute.
There is a critical omission in this section, however. An agency
can be reversed if "it relied on policy concerns that were...
precluded by statute."' 5 I have inserted an ellipse where I believe the adverb "explicitly" must be added. As Jerry Mashaw and
David Harfst have demonstrated, it is unrealistic to expect Congress to include in any statute a comprehensive list of the policy
102. Id; see 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 7A, at 310-12.
103. See Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
104. See Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries,
114 S. Ct. 2251 (1994); City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S.Ct. 1588
(1994); NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of America, 114 S.Ct. 1778 (1994);
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 114 S. Ct. 1439
(1994). All four cases are discussed in Pierce, supra note 18, at 8-22.
105. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1072 (quoting § (2)(D)(1) of the proposed stat-
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concerns that any agency should consider in taking any action. 6
Thus, it would be a serious error, for instance, to interpret a
statute as precluding agency consideration of the potential adverse
economic effects, environmental effects, or national security effects
of a proposed action simply because Congress neglected to mention one of those widely shared social values in a particular statute. An agency should not be forbidden from relying on a policy
concern except in the rare case in which Congress explicitly forbids it from doing so.
Subsection (E) seems to be intended to address the other factors that are made relevant by the State Farm version of the arbitrary and capricious test, as well as to restate the substantial evidence test in a new form. This section needs a lot of work. I can
not begin to predict the manner in which it would be interpreted
in the myriad contexts to which it would be applied.
As it is presently drafted, subsection (E) would create more
problems than it solves. Three questions suggest the nature and
magnitude of the interpretive problems that subsection (E) would
raise. First, does it require an agency to support each factual
predicate for a rule with evidence in the rulemaking record? It
seems to require the agency to do so. That is not the law at the
present time,c 7 and such a requirement would create major
problems in the common situation in which no data exists to support, or to refute, a factual relationship that the agency believes to
exist based on the agency's expertise in a field." 8 Second, what
is a "logically coherent explanation"'" for a rule? In the hands
of judges with strong ideological predilections, this standard could
prove as malleable as the requirement of reasoned decisionmaking
announced in State Farm. For instance, a decision to substitute a
marketable emission permit system for traditional command and
control regulation of emissions will seem more logical and coherent to a conservative than to a liberal. Third, why recodify the

106. JERRY L MAsHAw & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY
202-23 (1990). See also Pierce, supra note 62, at 79-80.
107. See Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 462
U.S. 87, 97, 103 (1983); FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981). See

generally PIERCE ET AL, supra note 27, § 7.3.4 (discussing judicial deference to agency
policy decisions concerning unknowable facts).
108. See 1 DAviS & PIERCE, supra note 27, § 7.5.
109. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1072 (quoting § (2)(E) of the proposed statute).

1132

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:1110

substantial evidence test? The doctrine that has been spawned by
the substantial evidence provision of section 706 has proven to be
both determinate and durable."' The recodification of that test
in proposed subsection (E) would force courts to begin anew the
multi-decade process of interpreting a complicated new combination of words. I cannot predict the ultimate result of that process,
but I doubt that it would be an improvement over the status quo.
Moreover, uncertainty with respect to the meaning of the new
words would be a source of confusion, litigation, and indeterminacy for the decades that would be required to obtain definitive
interpretations from the judiciary.
My purpose is not to criticize Shapiro and Levy's drafting
ability. I doubt that I could draft a better replacement for the
current section 706. My criticism is intended instead to illustrate
the extreme difficulty of writing detailed instructions to reviewing
courts that offer a realistic prospect of enhanced determinacy with
respect to the doctrines applicable to judicial review of agency
actions. I am not sure it is possible to improve on the performance
of the wise men who devoted many years to the process of drafting the present version of section 706.11' It is certainly possible
for the courts to improve their performance in interpreting and
applying that section. But I am cautiously optimistic that the Supreme Court will move in that direction over the next few years.

110. See supra text accompanying notes 25-40.
111. For a discussion of the history of the APA, see 1 DAvis & PIERCE, supra note
27, § 1A.

